ステークカジノの評判は？登録・入出金方法や当サイト限定 ...

--> Contact Us Sitemap Access 日本語 ENGLISH About RIEB Message Outline History Former Directors Organization Staff Accounts Internatinal Exchange Faculty Global Economy Unit Corporate Competitiveness Unit Corporate Information Unit Global Finance Unit Integrated Center for Corporate Archives Center for the Promotion of Regional Co-Creation Research Office of Promoting Research Collaboration Visiting and Adjunct Researcher Faculty Awards (in Japanese) Research Fellow Emeritus Professor Research Research Projects Publications Integrates Center for Corporate Archives Early Moden DataBase Seminars at RIEB Seminar Schedule All Seminars RIEB & Kanematsu Seminars Latin America Seminars Monetary Economics Seminar of Kobe University (in Japanese) Kanebo Seminar of Kobe University (in Japanese) Past Seminars Education & Society Symposia Social Contribution & Education Kanematsu Prize Sections Integrated Center for Corporate Archives Center for the Promotion of Regional Co-Creation Research United Nations Depository Library RIEB Library Computer Laboratory Local Page--> HOME Research Publications Discussion Paper Series（English） RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2020-22 RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2020-22 RIEB Discussion Paper Series No.2020-22 Title Endogenous Timing in Tax Competition: The Effect of Asymmetric Information Abstract This study explores the effects of asymmetric information on endogenous leadership in a simple tax competition environment (Ogawa, 2013). The study models a two-country economy where one country is informed about its own and opponent's productivity of private goods, while the other country knows only its own productivity. The results show that each type of informed country has an incentive to pretend to be the other type, which leads to a Stackelberg outcome endogenously, while the simultaneous move is the unique outcome under complete information. Under the Stackelberg outcome, the uninformed country moves first and the informed country moves second. Moreover, ex-post social welfare under asymmetric information can become larger than that under complete information, because the uninformed country chooses a less aggressive tax rate under asymmetric information. These results depend on the type of uncertainty, and capital ownership and share. Keywords Tax competition; Endogenous leadership; Asymmetric information; Pooling equilibrium; Welfare improvement JEL Classification D82, H30, H87 Inquiries Takaaki HAMADA Faculty of Economics, Toyo University 5-28-20, Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-8606, Japan Junior Research Fellow, RIEB, Kobe University *This Discussion Paper won the Kanematsu Prize (FY 2019). Site Top About RIEB Faculty Research Seminars at RIEB Education & Society Sections Site Policy Sitemap Access Contact Information © Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University. All Rights Reserved. Contact Us Site Policy (in Japanese) Sitemap Access 日本語 ENGLISH